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Optimal income taxes and transfers Optimal income taxes and transfers  
Tax compliance Tax compliance  
Taxation and Development Taxation and Development  
Policy design: unemployment insurance and moral hazard Policy design: unemployment insurance and moral hazard Rationales for Social Insurance. Unemployment Insurance: Baily Formula. Evidence for Moral hazard. Evidence for Consumption Smoothing
Policy design: health insurance and adverse selection Policy design: health insurance and adverse selection (a) Adverse Selection: Theory (b) Adverse Selection: Empirics (c) Rise in Health Spending (d) Impact of HI on Spending and Health
Policy design: pensions Policy design: pensions (a) Social Security Design and Reform, (b) Social Security and Labour, (c) Annuities, (d) Social Security and savings
Education Externalities (a) Externalities, property rights and the Coase Theorem (b) Choice of policy instruments: price regulation versus quantity regulation (c) Environmental taxation
Education Behavioural public economics (a) Bounded rationality, bounded willpower, bounded self-interest. (b) Implications for normative analysis: welfare economics and revealed preference. (c) Implications for positive analysis: examples.
     
     
     
     


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