LSE website  EC426 Public Economics      
  Michaelmas Term Material 

     
     
Policy design: social insurance Policy design: social insurance (a) Recent trends in Government Spending (b) Rationales for Social Insurance (c) Sufficient Statistics Approach
Policy design: unemployment insurance and moral hazard Policy design: unemployment insurance and moral hazard (a) Baily Formula (b) Evidence for Moral hazard (c) Evidence for Consumption Smoothing
Policy design: health insurance and adverse selection Policy design: health insurance and adverse selection (a) Adverse Selection: Theory (b) Adverse Selection: Empirics (c) Rise in Health Spending (d) Impact of HI on Spending and Health
Policy design: pensions Policy design: pensions (a) Social Security Design and Reform, (b) Social Security and Labour, (c) Annuities, (d) Social Security and savings
Education Policy design: education (a) Reasons for government intervention in education: market failure and redistribution. (b) The crowd-out effect of free public schools. (c) The arguments for and against school choice and school vouchers. (d) Measuring the returns to education. (e) Human capital investment versus job market signalling.
Education Behavioural public economics (a) Bounded rationality, bounded willpower, bounded self-interest. (b) Implications for normative analysis: welfare economics and revealed preference. (c) Implications for positive analysis: examples.
Education Policy design: optimal commodity taxation (a) Excess burden (b) Ramsey model (c) Inverse elasticity rule (d) Uniform taxes
Education Policy design: income taxation and transfers (a) Mirrlees model (b) Optimal income taxation (c) Laffer rate (d) Optimal Transfers
     
     
     
     


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